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Thirty Years of Chinese Reforms:  
A Historical Perspective
FRANÇOIS GODEMENT
Abstract 
China's reform agenda is understood in the light of a thirty-year process. In-
terpretations of reforms differ according to the meaning of the word.  Should 
Mao's heirs be seen as Leninist reformists, or as reformers in the  historical 
Chinese sense, aiming at transformation in response to the West? The impli-
cations are contradictory. The reforms have been successful, yet their term 
has never been clearly deﬁned. Reforms have been described alternatively 
as another phase in China's cyclical history, or as a transitional phase, or 
even as a change towards a hybrid regime with cultural Chinese features.
China has had 'true reformers', aiming at fundamental change. Their legacy 
is still present and Chinese society is eager for economic and social debate. 
However, actual reform has reached a plateau. The Party's undiminished 
monopoly on political ideas, its legitimization through nationalist pride, its 
hold over the media and communications, as well as global vindication of 
its cautiousness, all hint of a neo-classical restoration era. However, a new 
wave of reforms may question again the nature of China's political system. 
Key words: China, reform, political liberalization, transition, consolidation, cyclical 
phase
Introduction
Thirty years is a long time for reform and indeed one might more aptly 
speak of the reform era in the People's Republic of China's history. China 
itself has chosen to celebrate on the thirtieth anniversary of the December 
1978 third plenary meeting of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 
Eleventh Central Committee, which increased grain procurement prices 
and began reversing the Cultural Revolution-era verdicts against many 
individuals. It is ofﬁcially designated as the start of China's reform era. 
In fact, Deng Xiaoping and some of his lieutenants such as Hu Yaobang 
and Hu Qiaomu had begun brewing these reforms as early as 1975, ﬁrst 
on agricultural policy, and at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Lu 
2001). A full-blown press campaign had started in the summer of 1978, 
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revealing wounds and blemishes from the previous era and weakening 
Mao's ﬁrst successors. 
This celebration is therefore a tribute to the Party's reformist leaders 
who put China on its present course and it also serves to signal again 
a distance from the ﬁrst leader of the PRC, Mao Zedong. But it  may 
also signal the end of the Reform era and of a transitional generation 
in the history of Chinese communism, which suffered through the 
acute 'line struggle' of the CCP (Teiwes and Sun 1999: 7) and went on 
to create the kind of economy and society that Mao himself would have 
rejected outright.
In some ways the reform agenda has been accomplished today, 
especially if one takes a broader historical perspective: the sight, for 
example, of a PRC endowed with US$2.5 trillion (including probable 
unofﬁcial holdings abroad) of foreign currency reserves1 and busy 
recruiting ﬁnanciers from the defunct Lehman Brothers, goes beyond 
even the wildest historical predictions. Even if this is a temporary im-
balance resulting from globalization and 'Chinamerica',2 it is still an 
indication of success by any criteria. Let's not forget, China now has the 
world's second or third largest military budget (depending on where 
one places Russia), and will soon have, among other arms systems, its 
ﬁrst aircraft carrier, perhaps named the Mao Zedong.  It would seem 
that the late nineteenth-century goals of wealth and power have been 
met and exceeded.
Yet, from another point of view, reform has been contained within 
boundaries set at the very beginning. Deng Xiaoping's celebrated 
statement on the Four Basic Principles in March 19793—among which 
the main principle is the CCP's sole leadership—still stands. Any de-
bate on political reform we may entertain remains subordinate to that 
reality. The Party, the state and more generally public levers into the 
economy and society are today stronger, if less brutal, than they were 
in 1976. This could not have been predicted in the late 1980s. Even 
more signiﬁcantly, China's inordinate success, which is not conﬁned 
to ﬁnancial statistics or economic growth rates, is increasingly seen 
as having something to do with the success of the CCP. This bolsters 
claims for authoritarian management elsewhere, although the cultural 
ingredients in China's recipes actually make it less likely that it can be 
replicated elsewhere. Just as reform, as we shall see below, has politi-
cal roots in the Communist movement as well as a Chinese historical 
origin, claims for the success of authoritarianism are both political and 
cultural (Peerenboom 2007). 
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For a considerable time after 1978, political reform was thought to lag 
behind economic reform. Yet from 1975 to 1989, reform occurred under 
conditions of political line struggle within the Party, a process that was 
less and less violent, but still quite open and often very decipherable by 
outside observers. Increasingly, since Deng Xiaoping forged the concept 
of a 'core leadership' in 1989, we have been reduced to educated guesses 
about any political line struggle, although factional and personal afﬁlia-
tions clearly matter a great deal in China. There are now more voices, in 
China and even abroad, that would consider a wealthy and strong China, 
ruled through laws if not by law itself, viable without more fundamental 
political reforms. In 1997 (at Deng's death) and more decidedly in 2002-03 
(the move from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao), institutionalized succession 
under conditions of authoritarianism happened in a largely planned and 
orderly manner. 'Democracy' itself, a word that recurs frequently in top 
leader pronouncements,4 has taken on ambiguous meanings, from the 
domestic scene where it is equated with due process and control, to in-
ternational relations where it is largely synonymous with the sovereignty 
of nation-states and limits to international governance.
Historical Reformers or Leninist Reformism?
Whether post-1976 leaders are historical reformers or reformists in the 
Leninist sense really depends on the perspective that is adopted about 
the reform process itself. Has it been, and is it still, just a stage in the 
long course of the CCP's exercise of power and in the making of Chinese 
socialism? Are the leaders who have conducted the process since 1978 
therefore 'reformists' in the old sense of the word to the Marxist-Leninist 
tradition? That is to say, are they tinkerers and adaptors at the political 
'right', in the old Communist sense, of the main political line, which 
remains steadfastly driven by Leninism, and is in fact, in the Maoist 
version of Leninism, the 'mass line' upheld by the Party's vanguard? In 
this case the era of reform and opening up may be just another phase in 
the long history of China's Communist movement and its 'line struggles'. 
We may yet see either a consolidation of the Party's hold on society and 
its ideology, or even a new radical phase that could be spurred either by 
populism or by nationalism. In spite of the unquestionable liberalization 
of Chinese society, we see in place modernized instruments of control 
and propaganda and also the sudden appearance of mass campaigns 
and politics, although today they are more likely to happen over the 
internet than at the 'struggle meetings'5 of yesterday. China's spawning 
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of mass media and entertainment, including political TV shows and de-
bates, does not preclude a large degree of control over the limits of these 
debates; off-limits behaviour is still met with strong punishment. 
Or has it been a resurrection of the 150-year-old process of China's 
reform and adaptation in front of the West? In this case, the country's 
present leaders are reformers in the historical sense of the word, plac-
ing their steps where ﬁgures as diverse as Lin Zexu, Wei Yuan, Yan Fu, 
Zhang Zhidong and Sun Yatsen6 walked towards the success of reform. 
In that case we are also seeing a transformation, overt or covert, of the 
control system and the root ideology of China's sole political party, with 
plenty of fundamental changes yet to come. There could of course be 
phases of conservatism or even restoration, which seems to have been 
the case in China after 1989. But there could also be a constitutionalist 
movement—one really opting for the separation of Party and state, and in 
general a separation of powers, as has been hinted at some key moments 
in the history of the last 30 years.7 The transition to a market economy 
could lead to complete empowerment of individuals and private enti-
ties: ﬁrms, private owners, and in turn NGOs, religious organizations 
and ﬁnally political groups. That prospect is dreaded by Leninists, who 
believe that the ultimate success of a reform process entails the downfall 
of the regime that carried it out. They therefore want to reverse course 
periodically to maintain their overriding priority, that is, overall control 
of the system. But it has often been the historical horizon of China's 
reformers. Unlike neo-Confucianists and militarists, they have looked 
towards the rise of a China that would be more equal with the West, but 
also more like the West. Debates about property rights, including farm-
ers' rights, about justice and individual rights, and about deregulation 
and competition, clearly go beyond the framework deﬁned by reform-
ist leaders in the ﬁrst phase of the reform era (Oi and Walder 1999). At 
the same time, the above division between 'reformists' and 'reformers' 
is not an absolute criterion to judge the issue of political liberalization. 
There have been trends towards political democracy inside Communist 
parties, including China's, while some of China's historical reformers 
were unabashed exponents of a strong and even authoritarian state. Sun 
Yatsen's sense of democracy was much more rooted in regime legitimacy 
resting on the people at large than in the actual workings of a politically 
democratic system.8 Still, the reformers' programmes always rested on a 
very strong franchise for private interests, while even the most politically 
liberal reformist leaders have hesitated to genuinely guarantee property 
rights in the long term. Although we pay a lot of attention to political 
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reforms, there are liberal elements in China today that claim that the most 
fundamental structural changes will be achieved through the granting 
of full economic rights, or from the base to the superstructures, as Marx-
ism would have it. A similar cleavage in the late 1980s separated Zhao 
Ziyang and his followers, intent on market liberalization if not property 
rights, from Hu Yaobang, the liberal general-secretary of the Party, who 
promoted the reform of political processes ﬁrst.
In judging whether we see in China reformists or reformers, we deﬁne 
the political ﬁeld differently. Bukharin and Kautsky against Gomulka 
or Gorbachev, or Lin Zexu and Zhang Zhidong against Yan Fu and 
Sun Yatsen? 'Continuators' vs. 'liquidators', in the Leninist parlance, or 
liberal Westernizers vs. nationalist self-strengtheners, as one can sum 
up many of China's choices in the late nineteenth century? There are 
very different consequences for our view of China's reform process 
and of its future, depending on whether we analyse it from the vantage 
point of the Communist Party, its core tenets and its system of rules, or 
whether we see it as a much more widely based process of sociological 
and political transformation. Whether the collective leadership of the 
CCP passes on its core ethics or DNA, or whether it lets itself be absorbed 
by succeeding waves of liberalizing reforms, makes a huge difference 
in our view of present reforms.
Success without a Programme?
International views and analysis of China's reform process in the ﬁrst 
years after Mao's 1976 death were generally slow to recognize the re-
form potential of China's 'third generation' of Communist leaders, led 
by Deng Xiaoping. He himself was one of the very few representatives 
of China's 'second generation', having arrived in the inner sanctum of 
central power after 1949.  He had fully participated in the anti-liberal turn 
of 1957 at the end of the Hundred Flowers before becoming alienated 
by Mao's handling of the Great Leap Forward. Predictions were also 
blunted by the probability of recurring cycles of 'line struggle' between 
radicals and moderates (or red against expert), as they had usually been 
described in Mao's time.  Liberalizing trends and the economic loosen-
ing of the system had a very good chance of being just a phase in the 
PRC's endless shift from right to left, and from left to right. Fangshou, 
the cycle of release and tightening up, was a concept that applied par-
ticularly well to ﬁelds as diverse as ideology and intellectuals, but also 
to the management of the economy as a whole.  In fact, explanations of 
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trends by a political economy cycle work wonderfully until the Asian 
ﬁnancial crisis of 1997. The best description of China's cyclic politics 
(Etzioni 1969) relied largely on these concepts. It also added a pecu-
liarly Chinese and Maoist-inspired characteristic. Mao had believed 
in using the spontaneity of the masses, sparked by political manipula-
tion, to enhance China's dynamism against the bureaucracy. He never 
hesitated either to rein in brutally any movement he had started when 
he perceived a regime threat or simply had no use anymore for that 
movement. China's political cycles were therefore more pronounced 
and seemingly more irrational than in any Leninist-run system. In sum, 
Mao's manipulation of the masses had introduced into Chinese politics 
the irrationality of free agents, much as human instincts and passions 
are essential to generate a true boom and bust economic cycle. 
Therefore, both China's spring of democracy in 1978-79, and the 
epochal granting of land use rights to individual peasants in 1980-81, 
just could be seen as phases that might be reversed at a later point.  In 
fact, in 1985 and again in 1988-89, China's economy reverted to a more 
centrally planned stage and each time there were politically conserva-
tive arguments making the case for more ideological and Party control. 
Political scientists were therefore generally slow to recognize that Deng 
Xiaoping and his colleagues had really moved China from a totalitarian 
era to—well, to something else.  
'Transitology', a side-chapel in the cathedral of political science, can 
bridge the gap between totalitarianism and regime change, because 
it insists on the transition process itself rather than on its goal posts. 
Little by little, it simply would transpire that the process was indeed 
much longer than anybody would have expected and also that the end 
goals were not that clear, the stated objectives of China's Party-state 
notwithstanding. In sum, we could be faced with an endless transition. 
Similarly, an institutional school, abroad and in China, has appeared 
that argues for incremental and gradual legal and institutional change, 
for 'imperfect institutions' (North 1990; Oi and Walder 1999)9 as a realist 
option, and therefore for a due process that could be achieved without 
the separation of powers. There are valid arguments from China's 
Confucianist- and Republican-era traditions that have bequeathed to 
the PRC notions of personal rule by 'good leaders' (haoren) as well as 
inspection and control mechanisms. There is still also a lot of spin from 
the Maoist-era practices of 'small democracy' involving petitions, de-
nunciations, the ﬁght against bureaucracy and appeals to above. These 
practices have remained alive because reformist leaders have turned 
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the tables on their more conservative and dogmatic competitors, often 
engineering their fall through puriﬁcation campaigns. 
This could make the case for a uniquely hybrid political regime, one 
that would combine rule by the Party with checks and balances within 
the system. This is the 'Singapore hypothesis', bolstered in early 2008 
by a Central Party School report. In fact, that solution offers no ﬁrm 
guarantees. And if we adapt this theory to China's participation in in-
ternational regimes, it is striking that the leading international advocate 
(Johnston 2008) of an incremental and gradual view of China's integra-
tion now recognizes that much of the process of integration could still 
conceivably be reversed. 
If we rest merely on the fact that China is in transition, or if we are 
satisﬁed that incremental institutional and legal change equates with 
basic constitutional change in the end, we therefore explain much of the 
reform process itself, but not its aims: transition to where? Institution-
alization of what? Often cryptic in his pronouncements, because he was 
no theoretician and disliked Mao and the Party left's bombastic rhetoric, 
Deng himself encouraged such ambiguity. How else could one explain 
that he encouraged the framing of post-1978 reforms as deﬁning a period 
of 50 years before the instauration of socialism, a statement that gave sol-
ace to ideologues and abode to reformers? How could one explain that 
he deﬁned, famously, China's international strategy as a case of 'hiding 
one's talents and biding for time', a phrase that essentially means: 'We'll 
tell you later about it'?   Deng's ambiguous aphorisms and his ﬂexibility 
have done wonders to save China from political conﬂict and to extend the 
lease of the CCP. But they may return to haunt China. Groping for stones 
while crossing the river, another of Deng's famous aphorisms, is actually 
a rationalization of the extraordinary pragmatism, opportunism and cau-
tion that have characterized these 30 years. The mixture of uncommon 
governing competence, personal aloofness and ideological ambiguity 
evident in Hu Jintao, China's paramount leader today, are another sign 
that the road ahead is not set. It becomes clear that we have the contrary of 
what usually happens in reform processes: instead of having a programme 
without success, we have had success without a programme.
Restating the Fundamental Reform Dilemma
At some time between 1986 and 1989, the observers' consensus began 
to shift from a vision of another cycle in the history of the CCP's 'line 
struggle', with incremental reforms subordinated to the Party line, to a 
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more historical and in fact heroic vision of some of China's leaders as 
true reformers, potential heralds for a much more fundamental change 
of society and politics, if not actually regime change. This, ironically, 
happened as Deng Xiaoping himself had largely reversed his basic 
stand, siding increasingly with conservatives and planners who were 
holdovers from the Stalinist economy of the mid-1950s. He then turned 
against his own political lieutenants who had spearheaded the process 
of China's 'reform and opening up' from the mid-1970s. 
At precisely this moment, debates swelled up and links between 
intra-party factions and intellectuals outside the Party intensiﬁed. A 
quasi-general turn towards emulating Western institutions and thought 
happened, leading observers to believe that fundamental change could 
be afoot. Incremental and piecemeal reforms, leaving aside the core 
political system and institutions, would be followed by the rise of a 
generation of political reformers, associating open-minded Party lead-
ers and China's post-Cultural revolution wave of angry scholars and 
resourceful entrepreneurs. 
Yet no one should think that Hu Yaobang, then general secretary of 
the CCP (ousted in January 1987), and Zhao Ziyang (who succeeded 
him until his downfall after Tiananmen), were crypto-capitalists.  Hu's 
revolutionary and even Maoist credentials are irrefutable, down to his 
Hunanese peasant origin; Zhao sprang from the core of the Party system, 
even if he had long given signs of being a clever and non-conformist 
Communist cadre, and he was a Sichuanese to boot, as Deng was.  
Yet how extraordinary, in retrospect, that Deng's two main lieuten-
ants have advocated strongly for a form of political democracy. Hu did 
so in 1986, promoting the separation of Party and state (against Zhao's 
better opinion, in fact) and launching the 'Double Hundred Flowers' 
movement, a call for political liberalization that echoed the 1956 Hun-
dred Flowers: a democracy couched on the surface in Maoist terms, as 
beﬁtted Hu's personal life story. Zhao clearly equivocated during the 
Tiananmen events. He was trapped between his long-time experience 
of using political activists to tear down the fortress of bureaucracy, 
something he had learned in Guangdong province at the heart of the 
Cultural Revolution, and plain fear of the party elders and of a violent 
conﬂict. In communist tradition, reformists fear conﬂict much more than 
their dogmatic opponents, Deng being the exception that proves perhaps 
he wasn't all that much of a reformist.  Zhao may have been right and 
China is fortunate that the only leaders ready to shed blood were the 
conservatives, now rallied behind Deng as the Emperor Dowager. The 
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clear echo of 1898 and the failed Hundred Days reform is there, with 
Zhao as Prince Guangxu.10 Today, when a smuggled oral political tes-
timony by Zhao Ziyang, still alive, is published abroad, it is fascinating 
that we hear him advocating full political democracy as the only way 
to move China forward in the future.  
Both Hu and Zhao were progressives who had been involved in 
China's most heady revolutionary phases and both men who had been 
Deng's main lieutenants became quasi-democrats at some point. And 
interestingly, both men have been spared by their more conservative 
colleagues, in part because there is now a limit to the degree of politi-
cal conﬂict inside the leadership group, but perhaps also because they 
carried a large emotional and symbolic charge. 
Is that charge still with us today? There are echoes of the Party's 
debates of the 1980s today. The afﬁliation of many fourth-generation 
leaders, as evidenced by one perceptive political analyst (Li 2001), to 
Communist Youth League or Shanghai-based technocratic factions ech-
oes the Hu Yaobang-Li Peng antagonism. President Hu Jintao himself 
was a graduate of the Youth League group and hopes about his political 
liberalism have often rested on that observation alone. Premier Wen 
Jiabao was a close aide to Zhao Ziyang and there is no doubt that his 
successful media technique of appearing quickly and modestly among 
his countrymen at times of difﬁculty (from snowstorms to the Sichuan 
earthquake) owes much to the legacy of 1989. He has spoken more 
forcefully of political democracy on some occasions, including a trip 
to North America.
Constitutional and political debate remains muted in China, but fun-
damental economic and social debate happens, leaving no doubt that a 
new generation of experts, thinkers and leaders understands perfectly 
institutional and legal issues. Internationally, Chinese diplomats and 
legal experts are renewing the feat of their 1920s Republican-era pred-
ecessors, who often relied on competence and 'inexorable legal gradual-
ism' to win their cases (Kirby 1997). Innumerable cases of civil and social 
protest, movements for farmers' rights, lawyers' organizations and legal 
activists sprout up in spite of recurring repression. Chinese society, after 
30 years of reform and immense successes for government policies in 
many areas, is everything but immobile. It is also a fundamental reason 
why Chinese leaders remain so defensive on issues of sovereignty and 
outside 'interference' in domestic affairs. They, more than anybody else, 
know how ﬂuid Chinese society really is. 
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The Argument for a Neo-classical Era
Yet reform has reached a plateau and if one is to make a historical anal-
ogy, it is perhaps a successful restoration that is pursued more than 
anything else in Beijing. There are compelling arguments, also in the 
face of a global economic crisis that inevitably affects integrated China, 
why this might be the case. Some of these arguments follow.
First, the dynamics from intra-party line struggle, originally set in 
motion by Mao's political scheming, may be exhausted. Why should 
ofﬁcials from core Party organizations (Youth League or Party School, 
for instance) be more reformist than economic cadres or experts? If 
enlightened liberalism or despotism could only be harboured inside the 
Party's shell at the end of a long totalitarian era, it can be found today 
in the many meeting places of civil society and avenues for contact with 
international experience. As the Party succeeds in opening up China 
while retaining control, it is also clear that its political and intellectual 
edge over a vibrant society diminishes. We exclude from this view the 
multiple channels of learning and analysis that leaders employ, making 
them possibly one of the world's best informed political elites. The thirst 
for knowledge also implies a fear to fall behind the curve.
Second, legitimization by nationalist pride and a neo-classical po-
litical revival are shaping up this long-term restoration perspective. 
China has interrupted government contacts with Japan, and brieﬂy 
with Germany, and has recently postponed an EU summit, not to 
mention an interruption of military to military contacts with the 
United States after weapon sales to Taiwan. These constitute a very 
telling reversal of roles from 20 years ago. Instead of looking at the 
outside world as a mirror that they crave and fear at the same time, 
Chinese leaders, not yet adopting sanctions, are telling us from time 
to time, as the Qianlong Emperor wrote to King George III in 1793, 
that 'there are not many things we need from you'. The aesthetics of 
the Beijing Olympics ceremony, orchestrated by Zhang Yimou (who 
has excelled in historical ﬁlms about the heyday of the Qings), and the 
Chinese pavilion constructed for the coming 2010 Shanghai Univer-
sal Exhibition, are offerings to this neo-classical age, in the tradition 
of Ming-Qing court aesthetics. We are very, very far from I. M. Pei's 
transparent and gracile glass spires, which symbolized a cosmopolitan 
Chinese Bauhaus age. There are limits to arguments based on political 
aesthetics, but symbols are there to be interpreted, even if they can 
also be discarded later.
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Third, China's extraordinary search and emulation of technologies 
and institutional tools has led to particular results in two areas that 
affect our subject: media inﬂuence and surveillance techniques. Their 
combination gives the Party-state, with a much more limited reservoir 
of political activists than previously (but unlimited access to other re-
sources), a clear edge in remaining ahead of any potential competition. 
China's media are huge, colourful and entertaining, full of advertising, 
yet they keep debates within bounds and shape what is considered in 
China zhuliu sixiang, or 'mainstream thought'. Most Chinese viewers are 
likely to experience freedom and release, while political content is glo-
bal in coverage, yet tightly scripted. Surveillance—from the internet to 
crowd control—has made huge progress in the world's largest producer 
of electronics and computer parts, and with international cooperation, 
thanks to the fear of terrorism. When we see China's peculiar mix of 
societal freedom, political control or correctness and Big Brother govern-
ment, another neo-classical era springs to mind: that of the American 
mid-1950s, when contemporary mass entertainment exploded, liberty 
had bounds determined by the Cold War and William H. Whyte wrote 
The Organization Man (1956).
Fourth, global economic trends now argue more for consolidation 
than for innovation to a cautious leadership. The beneﬁts of a controlled 
and semi-planned economy, where industry and ﬁnance protection is 
still permissible under China's present WTO status, are evident at this 
time. All over the world, governments are called back in for at least 
temporary interventions and more long-lasting regulation. Enthusiasm 
for free-marketers is dimmed and Chinese reformers heading down 
that road face more political risk than previously. Still, we think this is 
the area where China is going to face the most immediate choices. It is 
going to be challenged by economic partners requiring yet again more 
openness and a level playing ﬁeld justiﬁed by China's very success. Then, 
any shift to domestic-based growth will require sudden progress in 
institutions, management, arbitration and regulation. In a way, China's 
increasingly externally led growth has avoided many touchy issues on 
the domestic front.
In the medium term, economic factors, pointing now to retrenchment 
and consolidation, might point to the need for a new wave of reforms. 
This would be in line with the history of the reform process since 1978: 
jumpstarting the economy in 1978, speeding up internationalization in 
1984, renewing the opening-up policy in 1991 and reforming for WTO 
admission in 1999-2001. These have been huge drivers for reforms in all 
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ﬁelds. This time around, however, economic reforms will pose questions 
of a more fundamental nature to China's institutional and legal system 
and ultimately to the balance of power inside the country. 
Thus, while political reforms have been frustrated and legal and in-
stitutional processes trapped under the glass ceiling of the Party's hold 
on power, economic reforms would be the engine for a further stage of 
dynamism. They have already given most, if not all Chinese, their best 
living standards in history and allowed for freedom of choice in nearly 
all walks of life, save formal rights to organizations. 
François Godement is Professor and Director at the Asia Centre at 
Sciences Po and Fellow of the European Council on Foreign Relations. 
(f.godement@centreasia.org)
NOTES
1  See the Council on Foreign Relations' blog post by Brad Setser of 13 April 2009 for 
an excellent discussion of the breakdown between ofﬁcial and 'hidden' reserves. 
Accessed 8 October 2009 from http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2009/04/13/chinas-
reserves-are-still-growing-but-at-a-slower-pace-than-before/.
2  The trade and ﬁnancial symbiosis between China and the United States has been 
coined 'Chinamerica' and recently 'Chimerica' by Niall Ferguson. 
3  They were enunciated by Deng in a speech on 30 March 1979, at the end of the ﬁrst 
Democracy Wall incident. See http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/
text/b1290.html. Accessed 8 October 2009.
4  Hu Jintao used it 60 times in his speech to the 17th CCP Party Congress in November 
2007.
5  Or douzheng dahui, meetings who 'struggled' an opponent of the mass line, the verb 
being used in the transitive form. 
6  Lin Zexu faced the British at Canton and became a controversial ﬁgure as a patriotic 
mandarin; Wei Yuan forged a new doctrine of statecraft and external relations based 
on adaptation and limitation; Yan Fu created the wealth and power catchword that 
would spread over East Asia; Zhang Zhidong was China's best known modernizer-
administrator; Sun Yat-sen achieved regime change in 1911—with much help from 
the modern part of China's Imperial army. 
7  The most intense moment came in May-June 2009, when martial law was proclaimed 
by the Party authorities. An attempt was made to convene the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People's Congress, China's nominal Parliament. The Committee 
would have had the authority to reverse the martial law order. The meeting could 
not take place as members, and crucially Wan Li, the president of the NPC, were 
prevented from attending. In his posthumous memoirs, Zhao Ziyang conﬁrms the 
story. See Zhao 2009: 33.
8  In 1924 he described China as a 'loose sheet of sand' and pleaded for cohesion against 
individual liberty as claimed by Europeans. See Nathan 1985: 130.
9  Douglass C. North (1990) created the perspective. 
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10 As we write, a Chinese pathological investigation of Guangxu's remains has ﬁnally 
found that the cause of his death in 1908, while under house arrest, was arsenic 
poisoning. 
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